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THE STRONG MEDICINE OF
OVERBREADTH As APPLIED TO
CRIMINAL LIBEL
INTRODUCTION
In 2000, Allan Parmelee, an inmate at the King County Jail in the
state of Washington, filed two grievances for two separate clashes
with guards.' In one altercation, he called a guard an "asshole" and a
"6piss-ant.",2 In the next, he called a guard a "shithead.",3 For each
grievance, King County charged Parmelee with violating the prison
rule prohibiting defiance, insolence, and abuse.4 After administrative
hearings, the County convicted Parmelee of both infractions. In
denying his appeal, the County admonished him "not to use degrading
language-respect those in authority."' For each infraction, the
County punished Parmelee with ten days of segregation and ten days
of lost good time. 6 Parmelee then brought suit, alleging that the
infraction violated his First Amendment rights.7 The Washington
Court of Appeals affirmed the administrative decisions, finding that
the First Amendment did not protect Parmelee's right to make
disparaging comments about prison employees. 8
Five years later, Parmelee was back in Washington State's
custody.9 This time, the charges pertained to a letter Parmelee sent to
the head of Washington's Department of Corrections alleging that the
superintendent of Clallam Bay Corrections Center was "anti male[,] a
IIn re Par-melee, 63 P.3d 800, 802-03 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
2 Id. at 802.
3Id. at 803.




8 Id at 807-08.
9Par-melee v. O'Neel, 186 P.3d 1094, 1097 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
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lesbian," and thus unfit to run the prison.10 Prison officials intercepted
the letter and charged Parmelee with violating the prison rule against
committing "any act that is a misdemeanor under local, state, or
federal law that is not otherwise included in [the prison] rules."" The
"not otherwise included" misdemeanor was criminal libel.'12 Prison
officials found Parmelee guilty of this infraction at an administrative
hearing, punishing him with ten days of disciplinary isolation and ten
days without privileges.'13
Parmelee subsequently filed suit, alleging that the infraction
violated his First Amendment rights.'14 This time, however, the
Washington Court of Appeals sustained his suit, finding
Washington's criminal libel law facially unconstitutional under the
First Amendment.' 5 Intuitively, it would seem bizarre that Parmelee
could be punished for calling a prison employee an "asshole," but not
for calling one a "lesbian." Under the First Amendment doctrine of
overbreadth, however, one who engages in unprotected speech may
challenge a law that purports to punish protected speech along with
unprotected speech.'16 As such, Parmelee was able to successfully
challenge his second infraction, even though the state had previously
been able to punish him for similar behavior. Because the state
proceeded under the criminal libel statute and not the prison rules, the
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine rendered his second
punishment unconstitutional. This outcome is justified by the theory
that overbroad laws have a chilling effect on speech. Thus, for the
good of society as a whole, an individual convicted under an
overbroad law has standing to challenge it, even if he could legally be
punished for his speech under a more narrow law.'17
The outcome in Parmelee was not the only one possible. It is true
that within the past twenty years, many courts have taken the same
course as Parmelee and have thrown out entire criminal libel statutes
on overbreadth grounds.'18 However, others have partially invalidated
or imposed narrowing constructions on such laws, invalidating them
only insofar as they violate the First Amendment. '9 This approach
10 Id




15 Id. at 1099-1106.
16 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
17 Id
1s See, e.g., Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45 (1 st Cir. 2003); I.M.L. v. State, 61 P.3d
1038 (Utah 2002); Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F.Supp. 1502 (D.S.C. 1991).
19 See, e.g., Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1073 (10th Cir. 1995); State v. Powell, 839
P.2d 139 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1991), cert. denied, 502
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might have allowed Washington to uphold Parmelee's second
punishment for unprotected speech, while narrowing the criminal
libel statute to protect the public from any chilling effect.
The current judicial split on which path to take results largely from
tension in Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding the overbreadth
doctrine. On the one hand, the Court has "'.recognized that the
overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine" and [has] employed it with
hesitation, and then "only as a last resort.""'... 0 When it is necessary to
apply the overbreadth doctrine, the Court has advised that the
judiciary should (where possible) partially invalidate or impose a
limiting construction on the law instead of striking it down
completely.2 ' Even so, the Court has held that judges should not usurp
legislative authority by imposing constructions that preserve
unconstitutional laws by effectively rewriting them.2
Many states still provide criminal penalties for libel under old
statutes that have never been updated to comply with the Supreme
Court's First Amendment doctrine.2 And challenges to these laws are
likely to arise under the overbreadth doctrine, since modem criminal
libel prosecutions are often brought over completely false,
unprotected libelous speech, where overbreadth is the defendant's
only means of escaping punishment.2 Consequently, the question of
how courts should treat overbreadth challenges against criminal libel
statutes is an important issue in modem constitutional law.
Furthermore, the courts that have heard overbreadth challenges to
criminal libel laws have largely not engaged each other on the issue
of whether to strike down or preserve such laws. This Comment
examines the legal history of criminal libel and the Supreme Court's
precedent on the subject, and proposes that, on balance, applying
limiting constructions and partial invalidations to overbroad criminal
libel statutes is the proper course under the First Amendment.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of criminal libel,
and examines its modem significance. Part 11 will examine the
U.S. 860 (1991).
20 Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999)
(quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 613 (1973))).
21 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) ("Facial overbreadth has not been
invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute.").
22 Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 741 (1984) ("The canon favoring constructions of
statutes to avoid constitutional questions does not, however, license a court to usurp the
policymnaking and legislative functions of duly elected representatives." (citing Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926))).
23 See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., infra Parts lIIIA, B.
2009] 555
556 CA SE WESTERN RESER VE LA W RE VIE W [o.5
tension between the Court's precedent dealing with overbroad
speech-restricting statutes. Part III will compare cases within the last
twenty years where courts invalidated overbroad criminal libel
statutes with cases where courts elected to impose limiting
constructions on such statutes instead.2 It will further argue that
Supreme Court doctrine makes legislative intent the most important
question when considering whether to strike down state criminal libel
statutes and that, absent special circumstances, legislative intent will
most likely cut against striking down a criminal libel statute in its
entirety.
1. CRIMINAL LIBEL PAST AND PRESENT
In order to determine the proper way to treat criminal libel statutes,
it is first important to know the origins of criminal libel, as well as its
modem relevance. By examining the historical justification for
criminal libel laws, one can determine whether such laws still serve
the purpose they once did. By analyzing the way that states have
applied criminal libel laws over the past two decades, one can
estimate the value of criminal libel statutes to modem society.
A. The History of Criminal Libel
Criminal libel laws punish malicious statements "designed to
expose a person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule."2 6 Though criminal
libel's origins can be traced as far back as ancient Babylonia '2 7 its
instance in America is most directly traceable to English common
law. 28 The common law regarded libel as a crime due to its origins in
the authoritarian feudal system, which depended on the absolute
authority of the ruling class .29 Because disparaging comments about
members of the ruling class tended to erode their authority, the law
punished libel as a harm to society.30 Truth was no defense, because
true statements could have the same detrimental effect as false
25 This Comment will confine its review of cases to the past twenty years because it is
concerned with the modern relevance and future treatment of criminal libel laws. Furthermore,
earlier cases were decided prior to a number of important Supreme Court cases that expand the
Court's guidance on the questions at hand.
26 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
27 Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in American
Jurisprudence, 9 Comm. L. & POL'Y 433, 441 (2004) (noting how Hammurabi's Code
"protected women from insult, and set death as the appropriate punishment for one who accused
another of a capital crime without proof").
28 Id at 443-52 (exploring how criminal libel became part of common law, and thus
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statements. 3 1 If anything, truth was an aggravating factor, because
true statements could damage the ruling class much more than false
statements.3 At common law, it was axiomatic that, "'the greater the
truth, the greater the libel."' 33
Criminal libel persisted throughout early American history, both
by the adoption of English common law and in statutes such as the
Sedition Act of 1 798.~ Though the authoritarian rationales
underlying criminal libel were less relevant in America's egalitarian
system, courts "'clung tenaciously' to its underlying legal justification
of preventing breaches of the peace well into the twentieth century.
Starting in the early nineteenth century, criminal libel began to
erode in America. By the early 1 800s, American law had begun to
accept truth as a defense to criminal libel prosecution.3 By the 1 830s
(if not well before), "the civil remedy [for libel] had virtually
pre-empted the field of defamation" in criminal libel prosecution,
with the exception of seditious libel.3 In the early 1 900s, the
Supreme Court limited criminal libel by requiring that, to punish
speech, the government must show a "clear and present danger" of
the harm the government seeks to prevent.3 In the context of libel,
this meant that the state had to prove that a statement posed a clear
and present danger of exposing the victim to shame or ridicule, as
opposed to merely showing it had a tendency to do So. 39
In 1964, with Garrison v. Louisana, 40 the Supreme Court all but
eliminated the historical version of criminal libel by applying the New
York Times v. Sullivan 4 1 standard to criminal libel prosecutions.
Under this standard, the government may not punish libel regarding
public figures unless it was published with "actual malice."4 2 Actual
malice is a mens rea defined as knowing falsehood or reckless
disregard for the truth .4 3 Garrison fturther provided that truth must
31 Idat 439.
32 Idat 448.
33 Id (quoting Robert Leflar, The Social Utility of the Criminal Law of Defamation, 34
TEx. L. REv. 984, 1017 (1956)).
34 Id at 456-58.
35 Idat 460.
36 Id at 459-60 (citing 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804)).
37 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1964).
38 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
39 Lisby, supra note 27, at 461-62.
40 379 U.S. 64.
41 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
42 Id at 279-80.
43 Id. Though the Sullivan Court applied the actual malice standard to public officials
only, id., the Court subsequently extended this standard to protect statements about all public
figures. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
2009] 557
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always stand as a defense to criminal libel."4 These requirements
constitute the test for the constitutionality of criminal libel laws to this
day. Therefore, a criminal libel statute today must a) provide truth as
a defense, and b) except from prosecution statements made about
public figures without actual malice. A statute that fails to meet these
requirements sweeps protected speech in with unprotected libel,
making it unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment.4
B. Criminal Libel Today
Though libel is no longer a crime in most states, at least twenty
states continue to leave open the possibility of criminal penalties for
libel .46 Four states and the Virgin Islands territory"7 retain criminal
libel laws that do not comply with Garrison (because they fail to
require actual malice with regard to public figures, and/or do not
provide truth as a defense) and have not been limited by court
decisions. Though criminal libel prosecutions are by no means
common, reported cases within the last twenty years indicate that
criminal libel still serves largely as a tool to shield state officials and
employees from criticism and insults, making them instruments with
limited social utility.
For instance, in Parmnelee v. 0 Neel,48 discussed above, prison
officials used Washington's criminal libel law to punish an inmate for
calling a prison superintendant a lesbian .49  Though the inmate's
speech would have been punishable under prison regulations,50 the
44Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73.
45 See Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (discussing the burden on
the State to prove its penal statute did not impermissibly cover protected speech).
46 See Lisby, supra note 27, at 479-81. Lisby claims that "twenty-three states, the District
of Columbia, and one territory still have statutes or constitutional provisions establishing,
enabling or governing the prosecution of criminal libel." Id. at 480. But the Washington Court
of Appeals invalidated Washington's criminal libel statute after Lisby published his article.
Parmelee v. O'Neel, 186 P.3d 1094, 1107 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). Furthermore, some of the
statutes Lisby cites arguably do not punish libel, such as the District of Columbia's proscription
on aggressive panhandling, D.C. CODE §§ 22-2301 to -2304 (2006).
47 See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-4801 to -4809 (2004) (punishing true statements made
without good motives and justifiable ends); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-47 (2007) (punishing false
statements in newspapers about public figures made without actual malice); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2739.13, .16 (West 2006) (punishing publishers who fail to correct printed false
statements even when made about public figures without actual malice); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§§ 771-81 (2002) (punishing true statements made without good motives and justifiable ends,
punishing truthful but unfair reports of official proceedings, punishing statements accusing
officials of crime when made without actual malice, and punishing false imputation of
unchastity to females, including public figures, made without actual malice); V.I. CODE ANN. tit.
14, §§ 1174-83 (1996) (punishing true statements made without good motives and justifiable
ends, punishing true but untair reports of official proceedings).
48 186 P.3d 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
49 Id at 1097.
50 Idat 1105.
558 Vol. 59:2
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case nevertheless represents a criminal libel statute being used to
punish an insult to a state official.
Mink v. Suthers 5 1 provides another recent example where a state
used crim-inal libel to silence a private citizen's insults towards a state
employee. There, state prosecutors used Colorado's criminal libel law
against Mink, the publisher of the online journal The Howling Pig.52
In the journal, Mink had posted a parody of a state university
professor, which sported a Hitler-style mustache and made arguments
"'diametrically opposed"' to the real professor's views. 53 After the
professor complained to state officials, police obtained a search
warrant under the criminal libel law, searched Mink's home, and
seized his computer. 54 Although the state did not file charges,"5 the
case is still an example of a state using criminal libel prosecution to
protect a state employee.
Man gual v. Rotger-Sabat?6 is yet another case of a government
actor using criminal libel laws to protect the reputations of public
officials. There, a newspaper in Puerto Rico published an article
claiming that a narcotics agent was having an affair with a drug
dealer. 57 The article claimed that this affair was the reason for the
inordinate number of drug case dismissals in local courts .5 8 After the
narcotics agent filed a complaint, the local district attorney charged
the article's author with criminal libel, again showing a criminal libel
prosecution being used to protect a state employee from criticism. 59
Finally, I.ML. v. State 6 0  shows another government actor
attempting to use criminal libel laws to stifle insults towards
government employees. There, I.M.L, a high school student, had
published a web site that mocked both students and faculty at his
school.61 The site claimed that the school principal was the town
drunk, insinuated that one faculty member was a homosexual, and
accused another of being a narcotics addict.62 When police arrested
I.M.L. for criminal libel, he claimed that he made the page in
response to similar sites created by other students.6
51 482 F.3d 1244 (0 thi Cir. 2007).
52 Id. at 1248-49.
53 Id. at 1249 (quoting Appellant's App. at 80-81).
54 Id at 1248.
55 Id at 1250.
56 317 F.3d 45 (1 st Cir. 2003).
57 Id. at 52-53.
58 Id at 53.
59 Id
- 61 P.3d 1038 (Utahi 2002).
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These and other cases64 demonstrate that, within the last twenty
years, criminal libel has been a tool to protect government officials
and employees from insulting and critical speech. This has changed
little, if at all, since 1964 when the Garrison court found that criminal
libel had little modern relevance except as a tool to punish sedition or
criticism of the government.6
This is not to say, of course, that criminal libel has no social value
whatsoever. When an offender is too poor to satisfy a libel judgment,
civil penalties may prove all but useless against him-in such
situations, criminal sanctions may be the best way to deter individuals
from publishing injurious statements about others. On the other hand,
it is difficult to envision local prosecutors, often operating with
limited budgets, providing anything more than sporadic enforcement
of criminal libel penalties. Therefore, when considering the subject of
how courts should treat criminal libel laws, one must take into
account the fact that criminal libel has questionable social utility, but
is not entirely without merit.
11. SUPREME COURT OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
A law is unconstitutionally overbroad when it prohibits protected
speech as well as unprotected speech.6 Overbroad laws violate the
First Amendment by causing an impermissible chilling effect on
speech, harming society as a whole.6 Because of this chilling effect,
it is not appropriate to allow an overbroad statute to stand until the
government applies the statute unconstitutionally, since in the
meantime many people may be deterred from engaging in protected
speech.6 As such, the Court has declared that a defendant may
challenge overbroad restrictions on speech even when his own speech
was not constitutionally protected .69  This stands in contrast to
64 See Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058 (10th Cit. 1995) (preacher charged with criminal
libel after accusing various state employees of being, inter alia, homosexuals and child
molesters); Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F. Supp. 1502 (D.S.C. 1991) (journalists charged with criminal
libel after one accused state legislators of corruption, and the other accused a state high school
principle of domestic violence); State v. Powell, 839 P.2d 139 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (state
university teacher charged with criminal libel after accusing university vice president of
academic fraud); I.M.L. v. State, 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah 2002) (high school student charged with
criminal libel after calling school principal the town drnk, claiming a faculty member to be
homosexual, and claiming another faculty member to be a narcotics addict). But see People v.
Ryan, 806 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1991) (upholding criminal libel charge for disparaging remarks
about a private person where the defendant circulated a flyer accusing his ex-girlfriend of being,
to summarize a long list of accusations, a very unsavory character).
65 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67-70 (1964).
66 Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 3 10 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
67 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67-70.
68 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,486-87 (1965).
69 Id
560 Vol. 59:2
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ordinary cases, where one may not challenge a statute by asserting
that it violates the rights of third parties .7 0 As such, without the
overbreadth doctrine, someone who libeled another with actual malice
(such as Allan Parmelee 7 1) would lack standing to challenge a
criminal libel law based on its overbreadth.
However, because the overbreadth doctrine allows litigants to
exceed the ordinary bounds of standing, the Court has limited its
application. The Court requires that, in order to strike down a statute
as overbroad, its overbreadth must be "both real and substantial."7 In
order to find a statute unconstitutionally overbroad, it is not enough
that one could merely imagine a situation where a law could restrict
protected speech, but rather the law must be significantly likely to
punish a significant amount of protected speech.7 Additionally, the
Court mandates that statutes should not be struck down for
overbreadth lightly; overbreadth is ..'strong medicine"'~ and should
only be employed as a last resort.7 Even when courts consider a
facial challenge under the overbreadth doctrine, the Court directs
them to preserve an overbroad statute (if at all possible) so as not to
unnecessarily interfere with state regulatory programs.7
These precedents leave courts with the quandary of balancing the
social value of protecting free speech with the Court's
admonishmnents to invoke overbreadth as sparingly as possible. The
contradictory nature of these rules is striking-courts should take
extraordinary measures to protect free speech from overbroad laws,
and at the same time courts should take extraordinary measures
to preserve those same statutes, insofar as a limiting construction
is possible. On balance, the only practical interpretation of
these conflicting precedents is that courts should take the middle
path-they ought to invoke overbreadth where appropriate, but they
should proceed carefully to ensure that they are not overusing it and
trenching on the power of the legislature by invalidating laws too
readily.
As argued above, however, criminal libel laws are not highly
valuable to society.7 And victims of libel have recourse to civil
70 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973).
71 See supra notes 1- 17 and accompanying text.
72 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975).
73 Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800
(1984).
74 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817 (1975) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613).
75 Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999)
(quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982) (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613)).
76 See supra, Part I; see also Lisby, supra note 27, at 481 (arguing that criminal libel has
no place in American law because it serves no compelling purpose and duplicates the civil law
2009] 561
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actions that, unlike criminal libel prosecutions, may award damages
to the victim. Given the availability of alternative remedies, common
sense suggests that protecting free speech from overbroad criminal
libel laws is generally more valuable to society than preserving said
laws. This social calculus, however, stands in opposition to the
Court's admonition that total invalidation should be "'.a last resort."'
Because legislatures have primary lawmaking authority, courts
should not adopt such a strained construction of a statute that they
reach the point of subverting its purpose or judicially rewriting it.7
However, because legislatures typically intend to pass constitutional
laws, partially invalidating a statute to remove unconstitutional
provisions would actually comply with, rather than frustrate, a
legislature's intent. This intent to preserve valid statutory provisions
despite the problems in other provisions is most clearly shown when
legislators include a severability clause in a statute .7 9 This shows that
the legislature intends for courts to invalidate the parts of the law
deemed unconstitutional while upholding the remainder, rather than
striking down the entire law.80 The Court has made legislative intent
the primary concern in deciding whether to partially invalidate a
law--""Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of
that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is
fully operative as a law... 8 1 This holding provides two guideposts
for determining whether to partly or fully invalidate a law: a) whether
the legislature intended the unconstitutional provisions to be
severable, and b) whether the law can still achieve its purposes with
the unconstitutional provisions severed.
Ill. OVERBREADTH CHALLENGES TO CRimiNAL LIBEL WITHIN THE
PAST TwENTY YEARS
As introduced above,8 when faced with First Amendment
challenges to criminal libel laws, some courts have totally invalidated
such laws, while others have elected to partially invalidate them or to
of libel). See generally Robert A. Leflar, The Social Utility of the Criminal Law of Defamation,
34 TEx L. REV. 984 (1956) (arguing that criminal libel is not useful to modem society).
77 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 817 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613).
78 Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 741-42 (1984) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964) (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961))).
79 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501-06 (1985).
80 Idat 506.
81 Id at 506-07 n.15 (quoting Buckley v. valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976) (quoting
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932))).
82 Supra Intro.
562 Vol. 59:2
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impose limiting constructions to preserve their constitutionality.
Having introduced the background and Supreme Court jurisprudence
on the matter, this Comment will next undertake to study a number of
these cases through the lens of Supreme Court precedent, with an eye
towards determining which cases are most convincing, those
prescribing total invalidation or only partial.
A. Total Invalidation Cases
The most recent case striking down a criminal libel statute was
Parmelee v. 0 Neel.83 The case dealt with Washington's criminal
libel laws.8 The first of the two statutes at issue forbade a person to
"6expose any living person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or
to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social
intercourse." 85 The next section provided the defenses to criminal
libel: the statement is justified if it "charges the commission of a
crime, is a true and fair statement, and was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends."8 It further provides that the
statement is excused if it was "honestly made in belief of its truth and
fairness and [based] upon reasonable grounds for such belief, and
consists of fair comments upon the conduct of any person [engaged
in] public affairs, made after a fair and impartial investigation." 8 7 The
court found that these statutes would punish false statements about
public figures made without actual malice as well as true statements
made without good motive.8 Because this violated the requirements
set out in Garrison, the statutes were unconstitutionally overbroad.89
The Parmelee court did not discuss the Supreme Court precedents
urging courts to apply limiting constructions to salvage overbroad
laws, but simply cited other courts' total invalidations of overbroad
criminal libel laws to support its decision to do the same.90
Similarly, in Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat,91 the First Circuit Court of
Appeals struck down Puerto Rico's criminal libel scheme as
unconstitutional .92 This scheme was very similar to Washington's-it
83 186 P.3d 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). For the facts of this case, see supra Intro.
84 WASH. REV. CODE § § 9.5 8.0 10, .020 (2003).
85 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.58.010(l).
86 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.5 8.020.
87 Id
88 Parmelee, 186 P.3d at 1102.
89 Id. at 1098-1101.
90 Id at 1101-02.
91 317 F.3d 45 (1 st Cit. 2003). For the facts of this case, see supra text accompanying
notes 56-59.
92 Mangual, 317 F,3d at 69.
20091 563
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punished libelous statements, 93 provided that truth was a defense only
when the statements were made with "good intention and justifiable
ends,"94 and provided that reports of official proceedings were only
privileged from prosecution if they were true and fair.95 Reaching the
same result as in Parmelee, the court struck down Puerto Rico's
criminal libel scheme as unconstitutional because it punished
protected speech, namely false statements about public figures made
without actual malice, and because it punished true statements made
without good motive.9 Like the Washington court of appeals, the
Mangual court did not attempt to reconcile the statutory scheme's
overbreadth with the Supreme Court's instructions to preserve
overbroad statutes where possible.
LML. v. State 9 7 considered the constitutionality of Utah's criminal
libel scheme.9 The statutes at issue punished statements "'.tending to
defame or darken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the
honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the natural defects
of one who is alive and thereby expose him to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule."' 99 The scheme only punished such statements
when made maliciously (that is, with ill will, as opposed to the
"4actual malice" Sullivan standard) and provided that malice would be
presumed when the speaker could not show a justifiable motive for
his statements. 100 Under the Utah Constitution, truth would serve as a
defense to criminal libel, but only when the true statements were
made with good motives and justifiable ends.' 0' Just as in Parmelee
and Mangual, the court found the statutory scheme overbroad because
it punished false statements about public figures made without actual
malice and true statements made without good motive. 102
93 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4101 (2001) (defining a libelous statement as one which
"publicly dishonors, discredits, or imputes any person of a crime or impugns the honesty,
integrity, virtue, or good name or reputation of any natural or juridical person, or defames the
memory of a deceased person").
94P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4102.
95 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4103. The court noted that the original Spanish text of this
section could be read as "impartial and exact" rather than "true and fair," but concluded that the
statute would not survive constitutional scrutiny under either translation. Mangual, 317 F.3d at
68.
96 Mangual, 317 F.3d at 66-67. while the court did not use the term "overbroad," the case
was effectively decided on overbreadth grounds because a criminal libel law that does not
follow Garrison punishes protected speech along with unprotected speech.
-' 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah 2002). For the facts of this case, see supra text accompanying notes
60-63. Two of the statutes at issue were repealed in 2007. See UTAH CODE ANN. § § 76-9-501
to -502 (2008).
98 I.ML., 61 P.3d at 1040.
99 Id at 1043-44 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-50 1).
100M. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-501, -502, -503).
101 Id at 1045 (citing UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 15).
102Id at 1048.
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Unlike Parmnelee and Mangual, however, the I.ML. court provided
a substantial discussion of the principle that courts ought to uphold
overbroad statutes where possible.' 03 The court noted that the
judiciary should, "whenever possible, construe a statute so as to save
it from constitutional infirmities."' 04 But the court also indicated that
it was bound by canons of statutory construction. 105 The court held
that any limiting construction must be based on the text of the law and
that courts do not have the power to add substantive terms or rewrite
an unconstitutional statute. 106 The court found that adding an actual
malice requirement, which could save Utah's criminal libel scheme,
would not comport with the text or accepted canons of
construction. 0 7 The issue was further complicated by the fact that
Utah's legislature passed the criminal libel statutes in 1973, almost a
decade after Garrison.108 The State urged that because the legislature
is presumed to be aware of the existing law when it passes a new law,
the court should construe the new law in light of the legislature's
intent to pass constitutional laws.' 09 The court dismissed this
argument, however, as the legislature had passed a constitutionally
questionable slander law in conjunction with the criminal libel
statutes-based on this enactment, the court decided that it could not
presume that the Utah legislature was aware of Garrison when it
passed the criminal libel Statutes.' 10
Of the three cases cited, I.ML. was the only one to address the
concerns inherent in deciding whether to totally or partially invalidate
a statute. Furthermore, I.ML. is consistent with the Court's holding
that legislative intent is of primary importance when making this
decision."' By explicitly finding that the legislature did not intend to
create a severable statutory scheme, the LML. court demonstrated
why partial invalidation was not appropriate in that case. But in
failing to address the issue, both Parmelee and Mangual are left with
little persuasive force on this question.
103Id at 1046-47. The court discussed Utah precedent to this effect, but the basic
principles cited are practically equivalent to those announced by the Supreme Court. See supra
Part ii.
IL.L., 61 P.3d at 1046 (quoting State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, 1 12, 31 P.3d 547
(Utah 2001)).
105Id
10 7Id. at 1046-48.
10M at 1047.
109 Id
1"0 M. at 1047-48.
M' Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506-07 n.15 (1985).
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B. Partial Invalidation and Limiting Construction Cases
In Phelps v. Hamilton,' 12  the Tenth Circuit provided a
comprehensive analysis of whether Kansas's criminal libel statute
should be struck down or limited by a narrowing construction. At the
outset, the court noted that "federal courts do not have the power to
narrow a state law by disregarding plain language in the statute just to
preserve it from constitutional attack."' 13 The Phelps court found,
however, that it had the authority to interpret an ambiguous statute
"6according to traditional rules of statutory construction, and then to
judge the constitutionality of such statutes as so construed."'"4 The
court found that, in making such an interpretation, it was permitted to
follow interpretations of analogous statutes."15 Furthermore, it
recognized that statutes should be "'.interpreted to avoid constitutional
difficulties.""'16 The court also recognized that the Kansas Supreme
Court requires Kansas courts to uphold statutes against constitutional
attack if there is any reasonable way to do so.' 17
Applying this law to the facts in Phelps, the Tenth Circuit
interpreted Kansas's criminal libel law to preserve it against
unconstitutional attack."1 8  Though Kansas's criminal libel law
properly provided truth as an absolute defense to libel, it did not
specify any state of mind as an element of the offense (in other words,
the statute failed to specify whether the offense required actual
malice)."19 Another Kansas statute, however, provided that, except
where otherwise specified, intent must be an element of all criminal
offenses.'12 0 Following this statute, the court found that intent to make
a false statement was an element of criminal libel in Kansas.'12' This
ruling provided even more protection than the Sullivan standard,
because the "actual malice" standard incorporates both recklessness
and knowledge, while the Phelps court found that only knowledge
112 59 F.3d 1058 (10Oth Cir. 1995). For a brief statement of the facts of this case, see supra
note 64.
13 Phelps, 59 F.3d at 1070 (citing Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 948 (10th Cur. 1987)
(citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972))); see also Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (looking only to state court decisions for statutory construction
because the Supreme Court "lack[s] jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation"
(quoting United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971))).
114 Phelps, 59 F.3d at 1070.
115Id (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).
116M. (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988)).
1171d at 1071.
"R8Id at 1073.
119. at 1062 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4004 (1988)). The statute has since been
amended to require actual malice. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4004 (1995).
120Phelps, 59 F.3d at 1072-73 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3201 (1988)).
121 Id
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would suffice. Also, while the criminal statute at issue had not been
previously construed by the courts, Kansas courts had construed the
law of civil defamation to require actual malice, further suggesting
that the court's decision to uphold the statute based on a limiting
construction was proper.12
The New Mexico Court of Appeals took a different approach in
State v. Powell.123 Rather than interpreting the statute at issue in such
a way as to render it constitutional, the court simply invalidated part
of the statute.12 4 The court recognized New Mexico precedent
requiring courts to interpret statutes so as to preserve them against
constitutional attack, but found that because the statute could not be
fairly read to require actual malice, no such preserving construction
was possible.'25 And unlike in Phelps, the statute was not ambiguous,
making it impossible to read the constitutionally required actual
malice standard into the statute.12 6 Rather than invalidating the entire
statute, however, the New Mexico court simply found the statute
unconstitutional "as applied to a charge of libel predicated on public
statements that involve matters of public concern." 12 7
People v. Ryan'12 8 also partially invalidated a criminal libel
statute. 12 There, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that the
state's criminal libel statute unconstitutionally punished statements
about public figures made without actual malice.'13 0 In reaching this
decision, the court paid careful attention to United States Supreme
Court precedent on overbreadth.'13 1 The Ryan court held that,
according to Supreme Court precedent, total invalidation is rare when
partial invalidation can preserve a statute against a constitutional
attack for overbreadth.13 2 The court also noted that the Supreme Court
gives great respect to the state courts' "'ability to narrow [overbroad]
statutes so as to limit the statute's scope to unprotected conduct.""133
Based on these holdings, the Ryan court found that the best course of
122Id. at 1072.
123 839 P.2d 139 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). For a brief statement of the facts of this case, see
supra note 64.




27 1d at 147.
128 806 P.2d 935 (Colo. 199 1), cer. denied, 502 U.S. 860 (199 1). For a brief statement of
the facts of this case, see supra note 64.
129 Ryan, 806 P.2d at 940-4 1.
130 d.
131 Id. at 939-40.
132 Id (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985)).
133 Id. at 940 (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 120 (1990)).
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action was to save Colorado's criminal libel statute by invalidating it
only so far as it purported to punish protected speech.134
Each of the above partial invalidation cases are carefully reasoned,
and each of them pay homage to the principle of judicial deference to
the legislature that the Supreme Court has strongly endorsed. Even
though the majority of the cases were decided based on state
precedent, all of the partial invalidation cases are generally in
harmony with the Court's suggestion that overbroad statutes should
be preserved unless it is clear that the legislature did not intend them
to be severable.
C. The Comparative Merits
As set out above, the Court has held that the question of whether to
totally or partially invalidate a statute depends firstly on the
legislature's intent. 135 And as we see in Phelps, Powell, and Ryan,
deference to the legislature and the assumption that the legislature
intends to pass constitutional laws lead most often to the end result of
partially, rather than completely, invalidating overbroad criminal libel
statutes.
Furthermore, the one persuasive total invalidation case in recent
years, LML. v. State, also aligns with the Court's emphasis on
legislative intent. 16In tha cste facts were simply aligned against
a finding that the legislature intended to pass a valid law. Not only
was the law enacted after Garrison without any attempt to comply
with its holding, it was also enacted alongside a companion law that
could similarly be found unconstitutional.137 While the Utah court
recognized that legislatures are presumed to intend that their
enactments comply with the Constitution, these circumstances
rebutted any presumption that the legislature intended the law to
comply with Supreme Court precedent. 138
In the absence of the sort of circumstances present in I.ML.,
however, the presumption that state enactments are constitutional139
ought to take precedence. In Parmelee and Mangual, for instance, the
courts did not give serious consideration to whether the legislature
intended the laws to be severable, or whether severability might have
134 Id at 940-4 1.
135 Supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
1361I.M.L. v. State, 61 P.3d 1038, 1046-47 (Utah 2002).
137Id. at 1047-48.
138 Id.
139 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2675 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Laws
enacted by the state legislatures are presumptively constitutional ... (citing Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
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preserved the statutes at issue.140 Of course, this would have been a
legal fiction if applied in Parmelee, because Washington's criminal
libel law was passed long before Garrison.'14' Even so, it is a legal
fiction that would respect the legislature's expressed wish to retain
criminal libel laws. Even though criminal libel is not a socially vital
criminal law, a legislature's decision to retain criminal libel laws
should not, according to the Court, be treated as a nullity.
CONCLUSION
While criminal libel laws do not serve a vital purpose in modem
society, the fact remains that libel is unprotected by the First
Amendment as long as the limitations of Garrison v. Louisiana are
observed. Courts in states whose criminal libel statutes have not been
tested post-Garrison will need to confront the issue of whether to
narrow, partially invalidate, or totally invalidate such laws when they
are challenged as overbroad. While it may be tempting to toss out
archaic and overbroad libel penalties in favor of civil remedies, courts
should pay due regard to the Supreme Court's holdings on
overbreadth. Though the Court advises other courts not
to tread on legislative authority by effectively rewriting statues, 142
the Court considers partial invalidation of overbroad laws as
respecting, rather than infringing, state legislative authority.14' After
all, doing the utmost to uphold the core, constitutionally permissible
proscriptions of a criminal law shows greater deference to the
legislature than voiding an entire statute. In the absence of special
circumstances that make upholding a statute impossible, courts should
attempt to impose narrowing constructions or partial invalidations to
preserve criminal libel laws against facial attack.
GIDEON NEWMARKt
140See Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 66-67 (1 st Cir. 2003); Parmelee v. O'Neel,
186 P.3d 1094, 1099-1103 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
14' See WASH. REV. CODE § § 9.5 8.010, .020 (2003) (indicating that the criminal libel
scheme was last amended in 1935). "In fact, the Garrison Court cited Washington's criminal
libel law as an example of the type of statute that failed constitutional scrutiny." Parmelee, 186
P.3d at 1101 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70 n.7 (1964)).
14 2 See Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 741 (1984).
143 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975).
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